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In an interdependent world, this sensation that not everyone who should be 
here is here, that our constituencies should be completed with other criteria of 
inclusion, that there may be some who have been illegitimately excluded from 
our group points to a triple inclusion—spatial, temporal and natural—that we 
should undertake: the inclusion of our neighbors, of our descendants and of 
the environment. None of these three “votes” enough. One of the principal 
challenges of contemporary democracies is how to reintroduce these subjects 
in our systems of representation and decision-making. If this hypothesis is 
correct, then we have a true democratic deficit and the habitual question 
about whether democracy is possible beyond the national state should be re-
formulated to ask instead whether democracy is possible without including 
those who are outside the national state, or more concretely, whether we can 
continue calling a political system a democracy if it does not internalize the 
interests of its contemporaries, does not anticipate the rights of future genera-
tions or does not recognize in some way the political subjectivity of nature. 
 
Keywords 




The building of constituencies—from the census of those who have the right to 
vote—is, as Montesquieu pointed out, one of the principal requirements for 
modern democracies. Establishing who votes, at what moments and under what 
circumstances has been one of the central issues of political discussions (Colo-
mer, 2001). Through the establishment of electoral districts, individuals are 
represented by virtue of belonging to a particular territory. These territorial lim-
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its are essential to determine the area of competition, the comprehensiveness of 
representation, the range of control of power and accountability. One of the 
principal achievements of democracy continues to be manifested in the right to 
vote, as census suffrage was replaced by universal suffrage and women were 
granted the right to vote. Nowadays, the universalization of the right to vote has 
been so complete that it would seem senseless to wonder whether there is any-
one else who still needs to be granted that prerogative. 
However, the concern about whether our social practices are sufficiently in-
clusive and about whether anyone is illegitimately excluded from the right to 
participate, through the vote or other procedures, is a genuinely democratic 
concern. It is possible that universal suffrage exhausted the subjectivity that 
could exist in a world configured into states, which is no longer our world, and 
that there is still someone who, literally and metaphorically, cannot vote but 
should be able to do so.  
Electoral representation does not allow for the taking of responsibility for 
problems that cross borders or that are distant in time, nor problems related to 
the environment; these matters demand another type of democracy, one which I 
will call post-electoral democracy, but we could also talk about an extension of 
parliamentarism, of inclusive democracy, transdemocracy, interdemocracy or 
ecological democracy. 
2. An Insufficiently Representative Democracy 
I begin with the observation that we have a crisis of representation (which is 
broadly shared), but we are not in strict agreement about its nature and the steps 
needed to overcome it. From the point of view of political subjectivity, the dilem-
ma we face is whether the number of people who intervene in decision-making 
processes is too great (this would lead to the revindication of national sove-
reignty) or too small (an idea bemoaned by those who would like to move to-
ward a post-national or cosmopolitan democracy). From the point of view of 
decision-making, the two options are between those who believe that elections 
are too much (Brennan, 2016; Achen & Bartels 2016) and those who think they 
are too little (Norris, 2015; van Reybroucke, 2016) when it comes to identifying 
and asserting the popular will. Some people are only concerned about collective 
errors, and others about the fact that decisions are not truly collective. Some in-
sist on reminding us of voters’ mistakes, and others emphasize the limitations of 
electoral processes when it comes to determining and asserting the popular will. 
For the first group, elections represent what voters want all too well and, for 
others, not well enough.  
The identification of democratic insufficiency that I am proposing focuses on 
something different. When one thinks that voting is too much or too little, one is 
assuming that those who should vote are voting and perhaps the most important 
question is not how they do it but who does it. My alternative hypothesis is that 
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jects, interests and values than there should be, which could mean that our con-
stituencies are incomplete. It is not that we vote or participate little, but that 
those of us for whom that right is recognized are few. We must add the subjects 
of democracy that are missing, going beyond existing constituencies if we want 
democracy under the world’s new conditions to achieve the principle of 
self-government that has always inspired it. “We” are the subject of democracy, 
but it may be that this subject is not yet fully contained within the list of those 
who have the right to vote. 
All modern democracies have chosen a type of territorial regrouping. The idea 
of democracy is connected to the census, as has to be the case, but it is worth 
questioning whether all forms of legitimacy are exhausted in this way, whether 
we represent in this way all that must be represented, whether there are other 
forms of legitimacy that we could call implicit or hypothetical, through which we 
recognize the category of political subjects who can only indirectly approve deci-
sions that are adopted or cannot approve them at all. Human rights transcend 
borders; they do not define them, but with democracy, it is just the opposite 
(Smith, 2003: p. 158). Democracy is encapsulated in the realm in which it 
emerged and in which we presume it is viable, but the question we should ask 
ourselves would not be about whether it is possible to transcend those limits but 
whether it is true that remaining on this side of them betrays democracy in some 
fashion. This leads us to consider other democratic deficits of which we are less 
aware than the ones that stem from not sufficiently recognizing the rights of the 
electorate: that the electorate itself is insufficient. In the end, this forces us to 
consider a democracy that is more deliberative than expressly representative or 
participatory. 
Modern democratic theory has been obsessed with rejecting the arbitrary de-
limitation of subjects whose interests are worthy of political consideration. It is 
from this perspective, then, that I propose that we take seriously the new consti-
tuencies that have sprung up with the reality of interdependence and the ecolog-
ical question: the inhabitants of other countries, future generations, non-human 
species. Cross-border self-determination, the rights of future generations and the 
politics of nature are the three principal issues that our democracies should ad-
dress if we want to include everyone who should be included in our processes of 
representation and decision-making. Our democracies should be opened to ad-
ditional contemporaries, to future generations and to ecological environments. 
Cross-border democracy, intergenerational democracy and ecological democra-
cy should fill out the ranks of what is currently a reduced electoral democracy. 
As Pierre Rosanvallon (2011: p. 122) has noted, election is not the same as re-
presentation; election is an “empirical convention” in the history of democracy, 
which is why he proposes “desacralizing it”. The aim would be to desacralize the 
electorate without renouncing the principle of democratic self-government, al-
though it might be better to speak of expanding democracy (representatively). 
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There is no need to renounce the idea that the people are sovereign, but we must 
keep in mind that the identity of the people is continuously challenged by the 
requirements of inclusion. Democracy is a political system whose sovereign is 
not closed or identified forever, “in which the people will be said to be sovereign, 
of course, but whose identity will constantly be open to question” (Lefort, 1986: 
303-304). 
This is not an issue of eliminating anything, not elections, not representation, 
not electoral institutions, but of making them more complex and inclusive. If 
democracies have kept alive and in tension the difference between majority and 
totality, that tension today points toward including our contemporary neigh-
bors, those who will inherit our present and the environment among those who 
are represented and those who decide. 
3. The Democracy of the Others 
Democracies have stopped limiting themselves to interactions with their own 
electorates. They must open up to foreign interests, examining the costs they 
impose on others when they adopt certain decisions. Globalization challenges 
constitutionalism and democracy, among other things because the “we” whose 
identity is defended and that is self-determined has lost its fixed reference to a 
stable framework of identification and management, such as the domain of the 
nation state or of a clearly delimited community. In the space of globalization, 
with porous and multiple identities, in the midst of complex interactions, where 
contagion and interdependency reign, when everything is contaminated and 
there is no protective space, the category of “us” is characterized by great inde-
terminacy. In a space of common goods or common evils, any delimitation be-
tween us and others that is too rigid is inappropriate. Of course, the voters 
should be delimited, but that does not imply that they should be closed in the 
name of popular sovereignty. We should think of ourselves in an open and even 
potentially universal fashion. At the same time, we must construct new systems 
of responsibility that are operative and reflect the complexity of an interdepen-
dent world. 
1) Cross-border self-determination 
Democracies barely have instruments to assure that “outside” identities and 
interests are taken into account in their decision-making processes. The legiti-
macy of cross-border institutions stems from the attempt to mitigate these fail-
ures, which constitutes a correction to the nation state, to overcome their short-
sightedness and include the recognition of other people in their own political 
structures (Joerges & Neyer, 1997). Self-determination today, under current 
conditions, means accepting the effects that the decisions of other nation states 
have on us to the extent that we have had the opportunity to make our interests 
heard in “their” decision-making processes and, inversely, to be ready to make 
other citizens the subject of our decisions. We have to work for a system of col-




DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2018.82015 210 Open Journal of Political Science 
 
to the concerns of foreigners.  
A society is not sufficiently self-determined when it is only nationally 
self-determined. This failure makes some sense if we keep in mind the political 
conditions in which today’s societies find themselves. The more determined that 
life is for citizens because of interdependence, the less their demands for 
self-determination are limited to the arena of the nation state. The rights and 
responsibilities of self-determination require us to abandon the “parochial fo-
cus” of political representation (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996: p. 146). The open 
character of democracies would be betrayed if the deliberative community were 
always coextensive with the demos of formal procedures of decision-making, 
with national citizens or the electorate itself. 
This is true to the extent that we can speak without exaggeration of a deficit of 
democratic legitimacy when a society cannot intervene in the decisions of others 
who condition it, but also when it prevents those others from intervening in its 
own decisions that condition them. In an increasingly interdependent world, the 
idea of “democracy in a single country” makes no sense, which does not mean 
that a deterministic logic makes democratic contagion inexorable or that the 
exportation of democracy is always just and effective. Formulating it instead in a 
negative fashion, we can see that when a democracy in one country is achieved at 
the cost of no democracy in another country with which it maintains a relation-
ship of interdependency, harming its right to its own determination, that condi-
tioning undermines the opening and inclusion that should characterize all de-
mocracies. Unlike the modern world of democratic states that do not need 
democratic environments—and those that could even benefit from a terrible ex-
ternal world or an antidemocratic enemy to maintain their own cohesion—in 
the current world, a democracy that does not promote—and we must strip this 
of any colonial echo—democracy beyond its own borders is unthinkable. It is a 
systemic, structural question, not a civilizing mission.  
2) The cross-border construction of democracy 
The “mutual opening up of democracies” (Nicolaïdis/Shaffer 2012) begins 
with the consideration that the subject that self-determines must be sufficiently 
indeterminate so as to include others in every case. Democratic indeterminacy 
must be open in order to allow some involvement in our decision-making 
processes by those who we understand to be concerned by our decisions, to the 
extent to which a relationship of interdependency is in fact established. It is a 
question of opening the door to the hybrid figure of “my aliens”, in other words, 
those who are both “alien” and “mine” (Shaw, 2003).  
The normative nucleus of representative democracy centers on the fact that 
representatives are required to report to those they represent—and only to 
them—because it was presumed there were no effects worth considering toward 
the “outside”, that could not be sheltered by reasons of state or undervalued as a 
neutral externality. As the interaction between states and their mutual responsi-
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litical decisions must be justified to the extent to which they are significantly af-
fected, since they can no longer be disqualified as mere externalities. The inte-
gration of a national political process in multilateral contexts expands the politi-
cal audience before whom political decisions must be justified (Neyer, 2012: p. 
69). That which is public—the realm of justification and decision—is not equiv-
alent to that which is delimited by the state, but includes “everyone affected by a 
problem” (Dewey, 1988). The idea of cross-border self-determination presents 
precisely a conceptual framework to think how we should make decisions when 
they reach beyond the state framework; it references this additional level of go-
vernance that is necessary to give a structural pathway for those who are affected 
by the decisions of others or, inversely, to internalize the external effects of their 
own decisions. 
Democracy implies a certain identity between those who decide and those 
who are affected by those decisions. Respecting this criterion means that the ef-
fects of the decisions of other nations are unacceptable if we have not had the 
opportunity to assert our affairs into “their” decision-making process and if we 
have not been prepared, reciprocally, to take other citizens into consideration in 
our decisions. We are all obligated to redefine our own interests by including the 
interests of our neighbors in them in some way, especially when we are con-
nected with them not only by physical proximity or general interdependence, 
but by the institutional community, as is the case with the European Union. The 
promise of national democracy to promote self-government can only survive 
Europeanization if at this level of interdependency there is a demand for a justi-
fying discourse that credits the systematic respect for the external effects of their 
decisions as something relevant for domestic decisions (Joerges & Neyer, 1997). 
The principle of taking everyone affected into account (Bohman, 1996; Dry-
zek, 2001; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004) can be a rigorous obligation or an un-
realizable lack of moderation, it can range from the mere requirement to inform 
to the strict obligation for co-deciding. In any case, what is important about this 
principle is that, defining the reach of the deliberative community by those af-
fected and not by its formal members makes the space for political deci-
sion-making less formal and breaks its closure into constituted state frameworks. 
The principle of affectation challenges the institutional closing of communities 
that are thus decentralized, open and revisable in each case. It is clear that this 
then presents a problem of indeterminacy, but it prevents the closure of the 
community that privileges its members, the aristocracy of the belonging that 
tends to crystallize in an electorate that is incapable of taking any responsibility 
in relation to others. 
Democracy is weakened when many of those affected by a decision have no 
say in decision-making, which happens in the space and time when decisions 
made within one country have a large impact in another or when they signifi-
cantly affect future generations, whose interests should be anticipated in some 
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of the electoral base, it cannot halt with their own immediate interests. Instead, it 
points toward a general obligation of justification that includes those affected by 
the decisions and their consequences. Although it is not always easy to demar-
cate this range, the obligation is potentially universal to the point that what must 
be justified is the reason we stop at a particular “us.” 
To the extent that interdependencies are increased, self-determination becomes 
more complex, both in space and time. We must move toward a cross-border 
self-determination of space in the same way we should point toward intergenera-
tional self-determination as the normative horizon of time. Self-determination is a 
principle that is not simply articulated by a spatial or temporal delimitation. 
Making self-government more democratic today means making it more complex 
so it can include the interests of distant places and times with which we maintain 
conditioning relationships and, therefore, certain responsibilities of justice. 
Self-determination continues to be a basic principle and, without it, democracy 
would be inconceivable; the problem is that in a world where there is overlap 
and conditioning, it requires thinking with greater subtlety than when the sub-
jects of those rights (peoples, generations, cultures) were more or less delimited 
units and could exercise their sovereignty in an isolated manner. 
4. Intergenerational Democracy 
Electoral democracies have a systematic bias in favor of the present, while they 
undervalue the future; in other words, they tend to place the interests of current 
voters above those of future voters, they care more about upcoming elections 
than upcoming generations. By privileging current voters, democratic institu-
tions establish an unjust electoral asymmetry: current citizens have a right to 
vote that future citizens do not enjoy. Future generations have neither voice nor 
vote; they lack power when it comes to politics in which only current voters and 
their interests are represented. The fact that current politicians are not held ac-
countable by future citizens has a decisive impact on their incentives when it 
comes to making decisions. 
One of the principal challenges of our democracies, if they truly want to be in-
clusive, consists precisely in exploring the possibilities of correcting this bias and 
finding a way to institutionalize the consideration of future voters. Moving to-
ward a type of intergenerational democracy would allow us to overcome the li-
mitations of electoral democracy so we can achieve the same radicalization of 
democracy in the dimension of time that I have proposed in the dimension of 
space: completing cross-border self-determination with transgenerational 
self-determination.  
1) The privilege of current voters  
From a cultural point of view, within the logic of consumption, when it comes 
to the environment, but also through our democratic practices, we embody an 
imperialism that is no longer related to space but to time, an imperialism of the 
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sists of living at its expense and an imperialism of the present that absorbs the 
future and feeds off it parasitically. Bertman (1998) calls it “the power of the 
now”, the present that is not invested in any other dimension of time. This 
present replaces the long term with the short term, duration with immediacy, 
permanence with transience, memory with sensation, vision with impulse. 
One reason for this reduction in the scope of our attention stems from the fact 
that the units of time in representative democracies are structured by electoral 
cycles. The rules that confer power on governments do so for a predetermined 
period of time. Democratic competitions that determine winners and losers are 
generally held every four years. This elemental rhythm marks the tendency of 
political strategists to focus on the goal of not losing power or on achieving it. 
Democratic elections are a competition, but only for the approval of those who 
vote in the present, not for those who may do so in the future, even though they 
may be the ones who are most affected by our decisions. This limits the political 
playing field since it requires that problems be dealt with according to the legis-
lature’s temporal time frame. Problems are managed in such a way that they im-
prove—or at least, do not decrease—the likelihood of governing in the next leg-
islative session. Any problem that does not adapt to these circumstances is de-
layed or confronted only when there is no other alternative. 
This attitude reduces public interest to the scale of voters’ interests. It simpli-
fies political power, reducing it to the power of the electors. Public interest is not 
merely the concrete will of the voters, but also an inter-temporal reality, the only 
thing that can justify long-term plans. The public interest is comprised of meas-
ures that are not meant to resolve but to shape: investments, structural agree-
ments, large-scale projects in areas like education, infrastructures, pension plans, 
energy policies, government reform, etc. In order to offer these types of issues 
the attention they deserve, we need a different configuration of political will-
power and a different temporal register so as to complement electoral rhythms. 
Our fixation on the present leads us toward a more uncomfortable question: 
do we have more rights than our descendants? Is it fair to create a “temporal 
preference for those who are currently living”? Would this not be a temporal 
version of the privilege that some people want to establish in space, a type of 
time-based colonialism? In both cases, a complicity of “us” is established at the 
expense of a third party: in spatial exclusivism, the third party was the person 
from elsewhere, while in temporal imperialism, the person from later is the one 
who pays the price for our preference. This is precisely what happens when the 
temporal horizon is narrowed: a type of “coalition of the living” tends to be con-
figured, constituting the present generation’s true dominion over future genera-
tions. The surprise that Kant felt when he observed how previous generations 
work so arduously for later ones has now been reversed. The opposite seems to 
hold true today: by making present time absolute, we make future generations 
work involuntarily in our favor. 
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recklessly deplete other people’s time or expropriate other people’s future. We 
are “squatters” on future turf. The more we live for our present, the less capable 
we will be of understanding and respecting the “nows” of other people. When 
the consequences of actions are extended through space until they affect people 
on the other side of the world and through time until they condition the future 
of people near and far, then a good many ideas and practices require profound 
revision. Both spatial and temporal interconnectedness should be taken into 
thoughtful consideration: anything that implicitly conditions the future should 
be made transparent and the object of democratic processes. A broadening of 
our temporal horizon is one of our most basic moral and political imperatives. 
In summary, this means we can no longer think of the future as the garbage col-
lector of the present, as an “unloading zone” (Kosselleck), a place where unre-
solved problems are sent so as to rid the present of them. 
2) Principles and institutions for intergenerational self-determination  
The realization that the destiny of various generations is as intermingled as 
the spaces of globalization calls into question our occupation of the future. If re-
sponsibility for the future has turned into an acute problem, it is because there 
has been an increase in the number of future scenarios we must keep in mind 
during present-day decision-making and planning sessions. This is a result of 
the lengthening of the causal chains that connect us in space and time. The 
processes of modernization create, among other things, growing reciprocal de-
pendencies in space. On the temporal side of things, as we shall see in a moment, 
this leads to an expansion of the chronological dimensions of the future. In fact, 
our actions have so much influence over the future that “we have a moral obliga-
tion, as we are making our daily decisions, to consider the well-being of those 
who are not consulted even though they are going to be affected. We do not 
choose this obligation, but it is imposed upon us because of the incredible scope 
of the power we exercise daily. We act upon the things we have beside us, but 
without any extra effort, our actions also bring about changes at a distance” (Jo-
nas, 1992: p. 128). 
These facts have set in motion a whole new set of reflections about intergene-
rational justice (Gosseriess, 2004). Discriminations that are connected to age or 
generational condition (where one generation makes impositions upon another 
or lives at the other generation’s expense) pose specific challenges to the course 
of justice. Most of the political decisions we adopt have an impact on future 
generations. For example, social service issues (health care, pensions, population 
shifts, unemployment insurance) need a broad temporal framework and a cog-
nitive focus on possible future scenarios. Is it morally defensible to convey nuc-
lear waste, a polluted environment, considerable public debt, or an unsustainable 
pension system onto future generations? We must weigh issues of justice when 
examining the things that get passed from one generation to another. These 
transfers include legacies and memories, but also expectations and possibilities 
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human, technological, and institutional capital. We should shift from property 
that is private, generational, and grounded in time to an intergenerational, col-
lectivization of time, especially the future. 
Generational interdependence demands a new type of social contract. In ac-
cordance with the new realities of spatial and temporal interconnectedness, it no 
longer makes sense to understand the social contract in an exclusivist sense. In 
other words, it cannot be limited to one specific community or to those who are 
currently alive. The model of social contract that only regulates obligations be-
tween contemporaries must be expanded to include future subjects with whom 
we find ourselves in complete asymmetry. Questions of intergenerational justice 
are not resolved with a sense of reciprocity, but with an ethics of transmission. 
The fact that the common good is transgenerational and universal relativizes the 
present and poses a limit to concurrent ethics founded on the basis of mere re-
ciprocity. There is a basic inequality between the present and the future that does 
not exist among contemporaries. If we only consider the meaning our actions 
have on our present-day interests, we will not be capable of understanding the 
ways we influence the future and the extent to which those repercussions require 
us to provide a political and ethical response. If we mine the consequences of 
this interdependency, we will have to consider what Hans Jonas (1984) has 
called a nonreciprocity of duties to the future. Care, consideration, concern, and 
responsibility extend beyond the realm of our closest connections. Preuss has 
given this imperative a Kantian formulation: “Do not limit the freedom of future 
generations beyond what you would be willing to allow previous generations to 
limit you” (1984: 227). 
How can we fulfill these principles in democratic institutions? On the consti-
tutional level, the first thing we can confirm is that few of them represent or 
adequately protect the interests of future generations. In general, there are no 
recognized rights for those who will live in the future, nor are there previsions 
for those citizens to be represented in legislative assemblies or in executive insti-
tutions. While constitutions protect certain minorities in different ways, there 
are no equivalent previsions for future generations, even though this may in-
clude many people and their interests may be affected by our decisions. All the 
constitutional checks and balances were meant to protect us against the tyranny 
of the majority; today we need procedures to protect future generations from the 
tyranny of the present (Tremmel, 2015) or according to a principle of “interge-
nerational neutrality” (Coleman, 2012) so that benefits and responsibilities are 
distributed between generations in such a way to ensure equality across time. 
Many of the explicit references to future generations are in the preambles to 
constitutions—as is the case with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean Union (2000), recognized in the Treaty of Lisbon (2008)—and they are 
generally of a non-binding nature, as mere aspirations. Some of them address 
this issue when they talk about protecting the environment or through the con-
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(Göpel & Arhelger, 2010: 5). They provide some orientation for policy but have 
limited practical or judicial value. Moreover, even if constitutions incorporate 
certain values and principles oriented toward the future, this does not guarantee 
that representatives and governments will give them sufficient weight in practice 
(Tremmel, 2006). The discrepancy on this point between constitutional prin-
ciples and political practices tends to be considerable.  
The exclusion or inclusion of future generations does not only depend on the 
text of the constitution but also the way changes to it are planned. As a matter of 
principle, the easier it is to modify, the less sovereign those who approved it and 
the more sovereign those who will have the possibility of modifying it. The con-
flict between the defenders of electoral sovereignty and its critics cannot be easily 
resolved. In any case, it would be good to design constitutions in such a way that 
the inter-temporal balance would be susceptible to periodic revision. It is im-
portant for constitutional reforms to be sufficiently restrictive so as to discou-
rage frequent changes but not to the extent that it is practically impossible for 
future generations to carry out the modifications that they judge necessary to 
respond to changing needs and challenges. 
Even if future citizens do not vote, there are certain modifications of the elec-
toral system that can be made to improve their inclusion in these processes to an 
extent. Debates about whether a proportional or majority system is better, the 
voting age, compulsory voting, rules for campaign finance … can reveal argu-
ments to support different objectives, including the question of what is needed 
to make the interests of future generations more present. For example: everything 
that has to do with the duration and stability of governments—requirements for 
investiture and censorship—hastens or delays the involvement of new genera-
tions in the change of parliaments and government.  
It is true that the interests of people at different ages are distinct and that one 
could normally presume that young people are more interested in the long-term 
perspective than older people (van Parijs, 1998: 297). The first group will have 
more interest in educational policies, the environment and fiscal prudence, while 
the second group will be more concerned about pensions. Given the aging of the 
population in advanced democracies and the fact that older people have in-
creasing influence in the voting booth, political decisions will tend to favor older 
people over younger people, as well as short-term over long-term interests. 
There is little empirical evidence, however, that young people are more sensitive 
toward the necessities of future generations or more altruistic than older people 
or that lowering the voting age means better anticipating future interests (Chan 
& Clayton, 2006; Freund & Blanchard-Fields, 2014). On the basis of the rate of 
intergenerational justice that was developed from a series of measurements, de-
mographic structure does not seem to affect the way policies favor certain age 
groups (Vanhuysse, 2013). Sweden, for example, has one of the oldest popula-
tions in the OECD, but its policies reveal very little bias toward older people. 
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policies that favor older people. There is no reason to suppose that empowering 
the younger generation will help impede future disasters and improve long-term 
governance. The solution to the problem of how to serve long-term interests and 
future generations should be more deliberative than representative and partici-
patory. 
3) Deliberating about mute interests  
How can we assert “mute interests” (Goodin, 2003: 209)? It is a question of 
incorporating those who cannot participate in democratic deliberations, who 
cannot speak for themselves, but who have as much right to be protected as the 
humans who are part of the current electorate. It is not possible to make distant 
or future people present, nor can we find a way to make nature available; we can 
only place ourselves imaginatively in their place and, in this way, deliberate 
about their interests. Who can speak in the name of future citizens and with 
what legitimacy? Future generations cannot authorize anyone to act in their 
name, which means we will inevitably be acting amid suppositions about what 
their future interests may be. Their identification and defense cannot be carried 
out except hypothetically or virtually and through controversy among current 
citizens. 
It is not very clear what it means to speak in the name of future generations, 
how to measure the effectiveness of what those who assume these functions car-
ry out and the ways in which they can account for their decisions, when those 
whose future interests are in play cannot express their opinions at this time 
(Smith, 2014). How, then, can we measure all this? Generational justice, unders-
tood as the principle of representing the interests of future generations, is one of 
our most highly discussed political concepts. All the models of overlapping gen-
erations or of generational accounting have a strong hypothetical dimension. 
Generational predictions must be legitimized individually because no one wields 
the unlimited power of representing the entire future or of rightfully speaking in 
the future’s name. The controversial character of these predictions is also aggra-
vated by the fact that the empirical desires of the supposed beneficiaries cannot 
be guaranteed, since there are no valid elections or opinion polls to reflect the 
views of future beings. In spaces of complexity, just as when we have to antic-
ipate the interests of other people, of future generations or of nature, when 
physical conversation is not possible, there is no solution except to practice an 
imaginative-reflective deliberation (Goodin, 2003), hypothetically internalizing 
the voices that cannot be expressed (or only to a very limited extent). 
We cannot be certain what those who come later will want, and for that rea-
son, we must arbitrate procedures to give the future the freedom to make its own 
choices. In this context, Jefferson (1984) even questioned whether all laws would 
need to be passed anew according to the cycle of generations. In a letter from 
1813, he states that we can consider every generation a separate nation with the 
right to make binding decisions but lacking the power to force upcoming gener-
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countries to do so. Contracts die with the people who signed them (1984: 1280). 
Nowadays, the ethical philosopher Peter Singer seems to defend a similar posi-
tion when he wonders, for example, whether our descendants will appreciate the 
wilderness or whether they might not be “happier sitting in air-conditioned 
shopping malls, playing computer games more sophisticated than any we can 
imagine” (2000, 92). Both are, in my judgment, abstract approaches, since they 
do not take into sufficient account the overlap and interaction between genera-
tions or the impossibility of strictly separating them. Although it is clear that 
there should be clauses and procedures for revision, any question about justice 
between generations must also take into account the fact that the generations 
interact; history is not a succession of discontinuities. There are connections 
between generations, such as duties of memory or the legitimacy of shaping the 
collective future, without which the very idea of a society would be incompre-
hensible. 
We do not have complete certainty about what will be necessary so that future 
generations will be able to flourish fully, and what they need will certainly 
evolve, but that does not prevent us from presuming that they have the right to 
have the greatest possible number of options at their disposal and that they 
should not have to take on more responsibilities than is reasonable. It is all very 
well that we defend their right to make their own decisions, but we cannot forget 
that their free decision depends on the existence of certain social conditions and 
common goods the assurance of which depends on our current decisions (Raz, 
1986: 250). Many of our decisions when it comes to sustainability, taxation, risk 
mitigation, catastrophe prevention, protection of democratic institutions, the 
preservation of cultural treasures, the provision of goods and public services can 
be adopted reflexively with the objective of not restricting future options and 
minimizing future damages. 
It is not so much a question of freeing future generations as the need to legi-
timize the way we inevitably shape the future. We need to configure what is to 
come in accordance with guidelines for justice that goes beyond our current in-
terests. We cannot allow ourselves the comfort of using respect for future deci-
sions as our only guideline for action, because certain decisions are required of 
us in order to afford coming generations any freedom of choice. The paradox of 
intergenerational respect could be formulated in this way: we must make certain 
decisions now so that they have the freedom to choose later on. 
5. An Ecological Democracy 
When the ecological question appears in our democracies’ political agendas, its 
first effect is the identification of a series of human duties when it comes to the 
natural world. The debates intensify to the point of constituting some rights of 
animals that humans should respect (Singer, 1975; Nussbaum & Sunstein, 2004; 
Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011). Without addressing this specific debate, I would 
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nature of democracy and questions the universality of our procedures of repre-
sentation. In modernity, democracy is conceived as a collection of institutions 
that have allowed people to abandon the natural world. The entirety of modern 
politics has been an attempt to escape the “state of nature”, which is not a simple 
metaphor. At the point at which this contrast is overcome, once we begin to see 
ourselves as part of the natural world, to recover our own ecological nature, the 
question that inevitably presents itself is the ways in which democratic represen-
tation becomes receptive to the recognition of nature as a political subject. It is 
not a question of having animals vote or setting aside seats for them in parlia-
ment, but of having nature be represented in some way in our democracies. A 
truly inclusive democracy does not necessarily imply that the rights of animals 
are recognized or that animals are granted a place in our systems of representa-
tion; what it means is replacing the modern paradigm that sets natural brutality 
in contrast with civilization and culture, substituting a new understanding of our 
political systems as insertions into a natural environment that does not corres-
pond with spatial limitations or with the logic of our electoral democracies.  
We are not only confronting a problem of how to manage certain public 
goods, but we are in the midst of a profound democratic deficit, a true exclusion. 
If nature has to be recognized, represented and included as a political subject, 
that means that contamination or the abusive exploitation of nature is not 
merely failures of our productive system; they also constitute a true democratic 
failure and reveal that our political systems, understood as completely distant 
from the natural environment, have established a sovereign subject that excludes 
other non-human subjects and nature itself, in other words, they are not fully 
democratic. 
This perspective questions the sovereignty of voters recognized as such. If the 
objective is to integrate non-human groups into society, to undo the privilege of 
our species (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011), then we must first question the pri-
vilege of voters recognized as such until now. The environmental question tacitly 
introduces new constituencies into the political agenda, thus problematizing the 
way representative democracies currently work. Environmental questions chal-
lenge the idea of an electoral democracy in various senses, fundamentally be-
cause they put in play goods and interests that transcend the national-electoral 
delimitation and because these issues cannot be adequately managed by the in-
stitutions arising from that electoral logic. Any deficit in ecological matters is, in 
the end, a democratic deficit and will force us to consider institutional alterna-
tives. Politics must be less anthropocentric and more biocentric. We need to 
move from the paradigm of national culture to one of a cross-border nature. 
1) Cross-border contamination   
Let us begin with the space-time challenge implied by the fact that ecological 
questions are decoupled from political delimitations. Pollution is a cross-border 
traveler. Large ecological issues have been almost completely dissociated from 
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sentation and decision-making) along three dimensions: through the creation of 
the problem (who or what type of conduct causes a particular problem), the im-
pact of the problem (who suffers what type of negative effects) and the solution 
to the problem (who is responsible for resolving it and in what way) (Mayntz, 
2009: 74). The origins, impacts and solutions to certain problems (problem gen-
eration, problem impact, problem coping) do not correspond to the limits of the 
traditional unit represented by state-organized societies. All of that defines a 
framework of interdependence or mutual dependence that implies shared vul-
nerability and demands that we reconsider who we are ultimately, whether our 
political subjectivity can be contained in an electoral census.  
The fact that environmental problems are not contained within our delimited 
spaces is particularly perceptible in the case of climate change, but not only 
there. There is no logical congruence between natural spaces (certain geographic 
regions, watersheds, spaces affected by the depletion of the ozone layer, meteo-
rological phenomena, cross-border areas that have unnatural divisions even 
when they share a natural space and others that are conjoined in spite the hete-
rogeneity of their natural settings …) and the borders between states with their 
electoral censuses. The political space and the ecological or natural space barely 
coincide, and political delimitations are not retaining walls that can limit the ef-
fects of our pollution or protect us from the pollution of other people. The ef-
fects are, at times, not even felt nearby, but produce alterations in remote re-
gions. Those who are most responsible for environmental degradation are not 
necessarily the ones who most suffer from it or who have the ability to resolve it. 
We are all both receivers and exporters of ecological damages. All our national 
institutions of representation and accountability end up being true anachron-
isms in a world that is defined by great mobility, spill-over effects, openness and 
particularly by a lack of protection by state agencies. 
There are also incongruities from the temporal point of view. In the first 
place, because the electoral cycle does not correspond with ecological time. The 
disconnect between those who decide and those who suffer also has a temporal 
dimension. There is imbalance in the creation of a problem (it takes less time to 
consume natural resources than is needed to replace those resources) and 
another imbalance which refers to the fact that those who have caused the prob-
lem and those who suffer or will suffer from it do not exist at the same time. 
Voters approve certain decisions whose ecological impact will not affect them 
but future voters who do not currently exist (or do not have the demographic 
weight of adults in an elderly society for whom the distant future does not mat-
ter very much). As if that were not enough, the time required for intervention in 
these issues does not match electoral time periods, accountability sometimes re-
fers to authorities who are no longer such … These and other similar incongrui-
ties leave us with a desynchronization that the founding fathers of modern de-
mocracy did not have the opportunity to observe.  
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gradations, they are problems at a distance, discontinuous in time and boundless 
in space, with latency periods and an impact that is distant or transgenerational 
and difficult to identify. In short, the limits of states and the delimitations of 
voters stem from various historical contingencies, in the expansion of power, 
colonial history, ancient tribal and religious divisions, certain agreements from 
the past, but the limitations on environmental protection are fundamentally 
ecological. I am not saying that voters should be made to coincide with those 
natural spaces, but if we want to address the ecological question, we have no 
choice but to reconsider that autarchy of political delimitations and open them 
to a dimension that is global, cross-border and cooperative. 
2) The alleged incompatibility between democracy and ecology 
Electoral logic hardly presents incentives to encourage those who vote or are 
elected for a brief period of time and in a concrete space to concern themselves 
with issues affecting another time and another space, such as ecological ques-
tions, most of which will affect other people more. Who can demand sacrifices 
now to avoid distant or future damages? What does accountability look like 
when it comes to our ancestors? What politician is capable of giving more 
weight to the rights of those who are not yet present than to his or her constitu-
ents? 
There seems to be incongruity between democratic procedures (especially the 
ones that have to do with elections) andenvironmental protection policies, as if 
democracy and nature are unable to get along. Democracy would be an impedi-
ment for environmental policies and the fight against climate change because of 
the relationship between democracy and time: I am referring to that concern for 
the fact that the institutions of liberty, such as politics or the free market, cannot 
resolve society’s problems and risks when they reside in the future (beyond the 
electoral cycle or the simple aggregation of interests).  
This is the reason that there has been a recent proliferation of technical insti-
tutions, such as agencies specialized in addressing these issues, and that there are 
even direct appeals for authoritarian solutions. In both cases, in technical depoli-
ticization and in authoritarian depoliticization, the starting point is a suspicion 
that the commitments required by environmental policies would have to be tak-
en out of the “political business cycle” in some way. 
The technical solution is justified by the existence of a “systemic short-circuit 
of democracy in an ecological context” (Bourg & Whiteside, 2010). This 
short-circuit consists, in the first place, in being an issue whose complexity is only 
identifiable by the experts, but that in a democracy is ultimately decided by eve-
ryone (particularly through elections). The agencies offer a solution to the prob-
lem presented by the contradiction between the short-term temporal perspective 
that characterizes politics and the necessity for long-term solutions in many 
areas, especially those related to ecological risks and environmental protection. 
An institution that was subjected to electoral ratification and its time-frames 
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long-term perspective, which is completely missing from our electoral democra-
cies. Environmental commitments—which have to do with interests that are by 
definition barely present in our decision-making procedures—require some type 
of justification that does not depend on the will of the voters who actually exist. 
One of our biggest problems is how to give weight to that which we share and to 
the future when governments have no incentive to take into consideration the 
negative externalities that their decisions produce in distant places and times. 
It is not illogical that, in the face of great environmental risks, we make an 
appeal to exceptional circumstances, calling for the technical depoliticization of 
those issues and even for authoritarian forms of government (Shearman & 
Smith, 2007; Lovelock, 2009), something that has been called “environmental 
authoritarianism” (Beeson, 2010). There are those who hope for this type of so-
lution from an authority figure who is not simply an independent actor, but a 
strongman, and they even talk openly about an authoritarian solution for envi-
ronmental problems. But the truth of the matter is that the countries that have 
done the most good for the environment—even if they have also been the ones 
who have most damaged it—are representative democracies. Non-democratic 
regimes (or those that practice this authoritarian modernization) tend to do 
worse at managing the inter-temporal trade-offs and environmental sustainabil-
ity than the democracies, even though they do not suffer from electoral pressures 
(Burnell, 2012; Congleton, 1992). 
3) A democratic politics of nature 
But there is a more fundamental reason to believe that democracy and ecology 
are not incompatible. What are we talking about when we talk about nature? 
Nature and the amount of protection it receives are not objective, indisputable 
issues. There are, for example, immediate reservations when it comes to defend-
ing the depoliticization of climate change because, even though there is broad 
consensus about the facts, that does not mean there is agreement about policies. 
There are many different natures, and the purpose of democracy is precisely to 
resolve the disagreement about the things we need to manage. The fact that we 
need to respect the environment does not negate the possibility of making a de-
cision, for example, between different levels of ecological risk, which means we 
already have a conflict between different voters who are similarly affected by the 
same problem. Like all policies, the ones that refer to the protection of nature 
have their costs. Sustainability involves the redistribution of costs and benefits, 
which is, in this case, an issue of particular complexity, which is why it is not at 
all surprising that there are certain disagreements surrounding it. Expert opinion 
does not necessarily align, even when it comes to questions about which we 
trusted the experts’ objectivity. 
It is also unsurprising, and for the same reason, that the environmental cause 
has taken on very diverse formats, some more democratizing and others autho-
ritarian: it has been a shout-out for help from the experts, but also a demand for 
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acquired forms of intolerant nativism; it has had moments of profound distrust 
toward science and technology while at other times it has decisively promoted 
them. This ecological pluralism is a sign that the call to nature does not bring 
about a definitive end to our controversies and that, therefore, it is not in prin-
ciple at odds with democracy, which is the political regime that assumes respon-
sibility for controversies. 
Arguments in favor of the exclusively technological-authoritarian treatment of 
these issues are too pessimistic when it comes to democracy’s capacity to man-
age ecological risks and too optimistic regarding the experts’ planning abilities 
(Stehr, 2016: 202). In areas where scientific statements are not indisputable and 
there are still opposing interests to consider, democracy is inevitable and neces-
sary. Only democracy is ultimately capable of handling with legitimacy the un-
certainties, the pluralism of values and interests that are put into play whenever 
we confront serious environmental impacts.  
Environmental protections demand a strengthening, not weakening, of de-
mocracy. It is true that ecological problems can sometimes be better handled by 
protecting them from popular pressure, but also by opening their management 
up to criticism and to citizen participation. Environmental policies and those 
combating climate change should be compatible with democracy; if not, in addi-
tion to confronting a threat against our physical surroundings, we would also be 
in need of defending our civilized way of life (Baber & Barlett, 2005; Dryzek & 
Stevenson, 2011). 
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